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The recent Mexican crisis brought once again to the forefront the age-old question of the pros 
and cons of’ using the exchange rate as the main nominal anchor in reducing inflation. Badly 
shaken by the aftermath of the Mexican debacle, Argentine policymakers have so far 
weathered the storm by keeping intact the currency board implemented in April 1991, and 
letting a sharply deflationary adjustment run its course. While the survival ‘of Argentina’s 
currency board remains a matter of debate, a voluminous literature has already emerged 
trying to dissect the Mexican episode and evaluate the role of political events, policy choices, 
and the handling of the crisis itself. No consensus has yet emerged, and the controversy over 
the causes of the Mexican crisis will surely linger for some time. 
When put into perspective, however, the Mexican crisis appears to raise a much more 
fundamental question. After all, most of the major exchange rate-based stabilizations (ERRS) 
in chronic inflation countries in the last 30 years have ended in spectacular financial and 
balance of payments crises. Moreover, there is a stunning resemblance in the dynamics of the 
main macroeconomic variables in all these programs. In the first stages, inflation falls, the 
economy expands, and consumer spending (particularly of durable goods) explodes. In light 
of this, the figure of the Finance Minister takes Godlike proportions. Shortly thereafter, 
however, the “dark side” of ERRS emerges. The slow convergence of inflation fuels a large 
real exchange rate appreciation which, together with the fall in private saving, lead to large 
current account imbalances and overborrowing. At this stage, the Finance Minister faces an 
unenviable dilemma: deflation or devaluation. Often forced by a run on the currency, he or 
she is eventually left with no choice but to devalue and then, having broken the no-
devaluation pledge, is forced out of office, vilified, and blamed for most of the economic ills 
of the country. 
The fundamental question is then whether ERRS carry the seeds of their own 
destruction. We address this question by empirically examining the dynamics associated with 
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12 major programs in chronic inflation countries and deriving the “representative” dynamics 
of ERRS. We find strong evidence in favor of the idea that ERBS give way to rather perverse 
dynamics which may lead to the ultimate demise of the program. We then critically review 
the main hypothesis that have been advanced to explain such dynamics in light of the 
evidence. In the concluding section, we offer some final thoughts and discuss the unresolved 
issues. 
 
I.   EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES 
This section examines 12 major ERBS in six chronic inflation (mostly Latin American) 
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Israel, Mexico, and Uruguay. Between 1960 and 1994 (a 
total of 210 annual observations), annual inflation rates in these countries were above 30 
percent in over half of the observations, and above 500 percent in twelve. This is in stark 
contrast to the inflation record of industrial countries and developing countries in other 
regions. For example, a similar exercise performed for six Asian developing countries (Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand) for the same time period 
shows a very different picture: inflation rates above 30 percent were recorded in only 12 
years (about 6 percent of the total number of observations). 
Naturally, policymakers have not stood still in the face of decades of chronic high 
inflation. The six countries under study have thus witnessed repeated attempts to bring 
inflation under control. The list of stabilization plans provided in Table I is far from 
exhaustive since it excludes numerous short-lived ERBS as well as programs that have relied 
on money (or credit) as the nominal anchor. For the empirical analysis, we restrict ourselves 
to the major programs described in Table 1 because they represent clearly defined and lasting 
episodes. Most of them have ended in full-fledged financial and balance of payments crises. 
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A.   Main Features of the Stabilization Plans 
The key common feature of the 12 plans under study is that they all retied on the 
exchange rate as the main nominal anchor: that is, policymakers set the level (or the rate of 
change) of the exchange rate, If capital is mobile across international borders, this implies 
that the supply of money will be entirely demand-determined. Aside from that, plans differed 
markedly in four main respects. First, in some cases the exchange rate has been the sole 
nominal anchor (orthodox plans), while in some other cases the exchange rate anchor has 
been supplemented with some form of wage, price, and credit controls (heterodox plans).2 
Second, the degree of commitment to a pegged exchange rate has varied across plans—and 
often across time within plans--ranging from the Argentine 1991 currency board to exchange 
rate bands in the 1991 Uruguay plan and in the late stages of the Israeli and the Mexican 
plans. Third, the magnitude of the accompanying fiscal adjustment has been rather diverse. 
While the fiscal adjustment was substantial in Chile, Israel, Mexico, and the Convertibility 
plan, it was all but absent in the Argentine tablita, the Austral plan and the Cruzado plan. 
Fourth, structural policies—such as privatization, trade liberalization, financial and labor 
sector reforms—have differed drastically during these plans. Despite the high degree of 
variation in these four key elements across plans, the picture that emerges in terms of the 
macroeconomic outcome of such programs is strikingly similar (Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) 
and Végh (1992)), including the disturbing observation that most of the exchange-rate-based 
plans examined here ended in some sort of crisis. 
 
                                       
2 Of the 12 programs in Table 1, five have been orthodox (the three “tablitas,” the 
Convertibility plan, and the 1991 Uruguayan plan), while the other seven have been 
heterodox plans. 
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B.   The Seeds of their Own Destruction 
 While conventional wisdom holds that reducing inflation is contractionary, the first 
“stylized fact” of ERBS is precisely the opposite: the reduction in inflation takes place 
alongside a boom in economic activity. In our sample, inflation was reduced on average from 
about 250 percent, at the outset of the plan, to about 24 percent (Table 1), while real GDP 
growth accelerated markedly (Chart 1). Second, most of the growth impulse during these 
episodes seems to come from private consumption rather than investment or government 
spending. Third, inflation has converged rather slowly to international levels. Such inertia 
has often given rise to a large real exchange rate appreciation (Chart 1): by the second year 
after the start of the plan the real exchange rate appreciation amounted, on average, to almost 
50 percent. Not surprisingly, a fourth common feature is a pronounced deterioration in the 
current account, as an appreciating real exchange rate and stronger economic activity lead to 
a boom in imports. As the recent Mexican experience reminds us, it is often the combination 
of large current account deficits, a low level of domestic saving, and an overvalued currency 
that eventually undo many of these programs. 
 
To examine whether the common pattern just identified is statistically significant, we 
constructed a panel of data for these six countries for the period 1964-1994, which allows us 
to cover the 12 plans listed in Table 1. We then tested whether the mean rates of growth in 
real GDP, private consumption, fixed investment, and government consumption (as well as 
the share of GDP of the last three variables) during these plans are significantly different 
from those prevailing during the rest of the sample.3 The results can be summarized as 
                                       
3 We define the early phase of the plan as the year in which the plan begins and the following 
two years; if the plan lasts two years or less, then the “early” dummy variable takes a value 
of one in the year the plan began and in the following year. If a plan lasts for a year or less, 
then the “early” dummy has only one entry (on the year the plan started). “Late” is defined as 
the year in which the plan is abandoned. For the three ongoing plans (Israel, Convertibility, 
Uruguay 1991) no late entry appears; for the plans that end late in the year (i.e., November or 
December), the “late” dummy takes on a value of one in the following year.  
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follows (Table 2). During the early phase of an ERBS, growth in real GDP, real private 
consumption, and fixed investment are significantly above their historic means: 
 
 GDP growth is, on average, 2.4 percent higher, while consumption growth is about 5 
percent higher. Public consumption growth is not significantly different during these 
episodes. The main driving force behind the faster growth is consumption, rather than 
investment: the ratio of consumption to GDP rises significantly (by about 3½ percent) during 
the early stages of the plan, while the ratio of investment to GDP is not significantly different 
during these periods. In fact, the ratio of investment to GDP falls during the first two years of 
the plan in about one half of the cases studied here. The evidence thus suggests that the 
deterioration in the current account is mainly explained by a decline in private saving rather 
than by booming investment. With regard to the end of the plans, the sharp and significant 
contraction in real GDP, consumption, and investment in the year the program ends, is (no 
doubt) influenced by the fact that many of the plans in the sample ended with a balance-of-
payments crisis. 
 
 
II.   EXPLAINING THE STYLIZED FACTS 
A large theoretical literature has attempted to explain the empirical regularities 
discussed in Section I. To organize the discussion, consider the consumer’s problem in a 
standard mode! of a small open economy facing a perfect world capital market. The 
representative consumer derives utility from the consumption of traded goods (cT) and non-
traded (cN) goods, and faces a cash-in-advance constraint of the form tt
N
t m)ec( =+α  where 
a is a positive constant, e is the real exchange rate (i.e., the relative price of traded goods in 
terms of non-traded goods), and nit denotes real money balances in terms of traded goods. 
The consumer chooses optimal paths of Nt
T
t c,c and mt, subject to his or her lifetime budget 
constraint and the cash-in-advance constraint. The familiar first-order conditions are (see, for 
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instance, Calvo and Végh (1994)): 
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where λ is the multiplier associated with the lifetime budget constraint and i is the nominal 
interest rate.  
 The assumption of perfect capital mobility implies that ,ii tt ε+= 8  where i*is the 
(constant) world nominal interest rate and εt denotes the policy-controlled rate of devaluation. 
An exchange rate based-stabilization typically consists in setting a path for ε. The four main 
hypotheses discussed below are consistent with the consumer’s problem just described but 
differ in (1) whether the reduction in e is perceived as permanent or temporary; (ii) the role 
of fiscal policy; (iii) the nature of the supply side of the model; and (iv) the presence of 
nominal rigidities. 
 
A.   Lack of Credibility: Temporariness Hypothesis 
A rich history of failed stabilizations makes the public rather skeptical of any new 
program announced with great fanfare by the new Finance Minister. Lack of credibility has 
been modeled as temporary policy (Calvo (1986) and Calvo and Végh (1993)). To illustrate 
the basic mechanism, suppose that the consumer is endowed with a constant flow of traded 
(yT) and non-traded (yN) goods. At t = 0, policymakers announce a permanent reduction in ε 
but the public expects that the program will be abandoned (with ε returning to its previous 
level) at some time T (> 0) in the future. Such an expected path of e implies, through the 
interest rate parity condition, that i is expected to be low during [0,T] and high afterwards. 
Hence, the effective price of consumption, given by ,iα+1  will be lower during [0,T] than 
after T. Intertemporal consumption substitution thus leads to a higher level of cT and a lower 
level of ε (a real appreciation) during [0,T] (as follows from (1) and (2) noting that 
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NN
t yc = for all )t( 0≥ . At time T, cT falls and e increases (the real exchange rate 
depreciates). 
 
B.   Fiscal Policy 
The real effects of ERBS have often been attributed to the accompanying changes in 
fiscal policy (see, for instance, Drazen and Helprnan (1988) and Rebelo (1994)). The effects 
of fiscal policy work mainly through wealth effects. To illustrate such a mechanism, suppose 
that there is a constant endowment flow of both goods and that the government finances 
spending on traded goods (gT) with lump-sum taxes. Consider then an unanticipated and 
permanent reduction in e that is accompanied by a permanent reduction in gT. Since a 
permanent fall in ε  has no real effects in this simple model, the only effects are those caused 
by the fall in gT, which is equivalent to an increase in yT. This leads, through a wealth effect, 
to a permanent increase in cT and a permanent fail in e (a real appreciation). 
 
C.   Supply-Side Effects 
Other authors have stressed the rise in investment and labor supply that may result 
from a permanent reduction in the devaluation rate (Roldos (1993, 1995), Uribe (1995)). To 
capture such effects, leisure must be added as a choice variable and a two-sector supply side 
with capital and labor must be appended to the consumer’s problem (Rebelo and Végh, 
1995). investment is typically assumed to be a cash good, which implies that a reduction in 
inflation increases the marginal productivity of capital adjusted by transaction costs. The 
resulting wealth effect, together with the increase in investment, lead to a boom in economic 
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activity (i.e., consumption, output, and employment increase), a real appreciation, and a 
current account deficit. 
 
D.   Inflation Inertia 
An older explanation, first explored by Rodriguez (1982) and recently revived by 
Dornbusch and Werner (1994), attributes the real effects of ERBS to the presence of inflation 
inertia. Widespread indexation of nominal wages and other prices often imparts inflation a 
life of its own. Given the consumer’s problem described above, inflation inertia can be 
captured by retaining the assumption of a constant endowment of the traded good and 
positing that the output of the non-traded goad is demand-determined (see Calvo and Végh, 
1994). The model is then closed by assuming that the inflation rate of home goods, π, is a 
predetermined variable whose rate of change depends positively on excess aggregate demand 
and on the gap between ε and π. Then (under certain parameter configurations), a permanent 
fall in ε leads to an initial boom (caused by the fall in the domestic real interest rate) and a 
Later recession (brought about by the real exchange rate appreciation). 
 
E.   Evaluating the Theories in Light of the Evidence 
When simulated in terms of a single unified model, no single hypothesis is capable in 
isolation of reproducing all the empirical regularities (Rebelo and Végh, 1995). However, 
some tentative conclusions can be drawn based on the evidence presented in Section L First, 
fiscal explanations might be discarded based on their poor predictive power and on the fact 
that they vary widely across plans. Second, although investment effects are important in 
helping the quantitative explanatory power of the various hypotheses (Rebelo and Végh, 
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1995), in practice they do not seem to be the main driving force, as discussed in Section I. 
We would thus argue that the most promising hypotheses are those based on inflation inertia 
and on lack of credibility (temporariness), particularly because both are capable of predicting 
the hard-landing scenarios most often observed in practice. These two hypotheses, however, 
are not without problems. Since estimated intertemporal elasticities of substitution are 
generally small, large reductions in nominal interest rates are needed to generate the observed 
consumption booms (Reinhart and Végh, 1995). The sticky inflation hypothesis critically 
relies on an initial fall in real interest rates which (at least in ex-post terms) did not take place 
in the heterodox plans of the mid-1980s (Végh, 1992). In conclusion, while there is no 
"perfect" theory (and often a combination of the different channels may provide the best 
picture), lack of credibility and inflation inertia appear to provide the most useful frameworks 
to think about the dynamics of ERBS. 
 
III.   FINAL THOUGHTS 
The book on exchange race-based stabilization in chronic inflation countries is filled 
with pages and pages of costly and spectacular failures. Successes are as rare as a flawless 
diamond. While country-specific and/or external shocks might have contributed to the 
demise of several programs, ERBS appear to lead to a dynamic adjustment which often 
carries the seeds of its own destruction. In light of the evidence, should policymakers 
abandon altogether the use of the exchange rate as the main nominal anchor? Surely not. 
Alternative anchors (such as a monetary aggregate) are particularly difficult to implement in 
high inflation countries (due to highly unstable money demand functions) and may also entail 
large costs. However, the strategy of using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor clearly 
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needs to be examined more carefully. While we now seem to have a good positive 
understanding of these programs, we are in dire need of some guidance on the normative 
side. Two major questions come to mind. First, is there an optimal time to exit a peg? Could 
policymakers enjoy the benefits of riding the pegged-exchange rate car for some time and 
then get out of it just in time to avoid the precipice? Naturally, if expectations are critical in 
understanding the dynamics of ERBS (as in the temporariness hypothesis), the public’s 
anticipation of such a policy would itself cause the boom-recession cycle that policymakers 
are trying to avoid. If inflation rigidities are the key element, then exiting the peg at some 
point might indeed be an optimal policy. Second, how should the often-mentioned but ill-
defined concept of “current account sustainability” be approached? Imagine an exchange 
rate-based stabilization which has led to a current account deficit of 8-10 percent of GDP. 
The hard-die neoclassical economist would sit back, relax, and watch in dismay as the hard-
die Keynesian runs to the phone urging for a devaluation. Until the theory offers better 
insights into the notion of “current account sustainability,” reactions will be grounded more 
on policymakers’ feelings than on solid economic grounds. 
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Table 1. Feature of Major Exchange-Rate-Based Inflation Stabilized Plans 
 
   Inflation Rates  
Plan Beginning and Ending Dates Exchange Rate Arrangement  The Start of 
the Plan1 
Lowest 
Achieved1 
 
 
Brazil, 1964 
 
Argentina, 1967 
 
Uruguay, 1968 
 
Chilean Tablita 
 
Uruguayan Tablita 
 
Argentine Tablita 
 
Israel, 1985 
 
Austral (Argentina) 
 
 
Cruzado (Brazil) 
 
Mexico, 1987 
 
Uruguay, 1991 
 
 
Convertibility (Argentina) 
 
 
 
March, 1964 – August, 1968 
 
March, 1967 – May, 1970 
 
May, 1968 – December, 1971 
 
February, 1978 – June, 1982 
 
October, 1978 – October, 1982 
 
December, 1978 – February, 1981 
 
July, 1985 – present 
 
June, 1985 – September, 1986 
 
 
February, 1986 – November, 1986 
 
December, 1987 – December, 1994 
 
January, 1991 – present 
 
 
April, 1991 – present 
 
 
 
 
Peg (to the U.S. dollar) 
 
Peg (to the U.S. dollar) 
 
Peg (to the U.S. dollar) 
 
Exchange rate policy had two-stages 
during the program 
Pre-announce crawling peg (to the 
U.S. dollar) 
Pre-announced crawling peg (to the 
U.S. dollar) 
Exchange rate policy had four stages 
during the program  
Crawling peg (to the U.S. dollar) 
 
 
Initial peg (to the U.S. dollar) followed 
by mini-devaluations 
Exchange rate policy had three stages 
during the program. 
Exchange rate policy had two stages 
during the program. 
 
Currency board with a peg (to the U.S. 
dollar) 
 
93.6 
 
26.4 
 
182.9 
 
52.1 
 
41.2 
 
169.9 
 
445.4 
 
1128.9 
 
 
286.0 
 
159.0 
 
133.7 
 
 
267.0 
 
 
18.9 
 
5.7 
 
9.5 
 
3.7 
 
11.0 
 
81.6 
 
9.6 
 
50.1 
 
 
52.1 
 
6.7 
 
41.3 
 
 
3.2 
 
No. Although reserve looses were large and the Cruzeiro 
is devalued by 16%, inflation and growth remain stable. 
Yes. The initial 14 percent devaluation was followed by 
successive devaluations and on 85% decline in reserves. 
Yes. The initial 24 percent devaluation was followed by 
successive devaluations and an 81% decline in reserves. 
Yes. About 65 percent of bank reserves were lost and by 
February 1983 the currency had depreciated by 102% 
Yes. By March of 1983 the central bank had lost 90% of 
its reserves and the peso had devalued by nearly 200%. 
Yes. In the 12 months that followed the currency 
depreciated by 347% and reserves fell by 71%. 
No. Inflation has continued to gradually decline and the 
current account has remained stable. 
Yes. In the 12 months that followed reserves fell by 75% 
and inflation spiraled, exceeding 25,000 by February 
1990. 
Yes. In the 4 months that followed reserves fell by 58% 
and inflation spiraled to about 11,000 by February 1989. 
Yes. Between February 1994 and January 1995, reserves 
fell by 85% and the peso depreciated by about 100%. 
No. Uruguay was not much affected by the Mexican 
crisis, as reserves and the exchange rate have remained 
stable. 
Yes? While the peg has been maintained, reserves fell by 
52% between mid-1994 and March 1995 as the crisis in 
Mexico spilled over. Bank deposits felt by 18% in the 
December 1994-March 1995 period. 
1 The inflation rate is the 12 – month change in the consumer price index. 
2 In the first stage of the program the authorities announced a decreasing rate of devaluation. In June 1979, the exchange rate was fixed at 39 pesos per U.S. dollar. 
3 On July 1985, the New Israeli Shekel was pegged to the U.S. dollar; in August 1986 the dollar peg was replaced by a peg to a basked of currencies. The second phase of   the program saw a 
sequence of devaluation during 1987—early 1989. In January 1989 a band with a fixed central parity was introduced. In December 1991 a crawling band  was introduced. 
4 In the first stage, the peso was pegged to the US dollar. Between January 1989 and November 1991 the peso moved according to a preannounced crawling peg. In the third phase of the program an 
exchange rate band was announced. 
5 In January 1991 the rate of devaluation is reduced considerably. On December 1, 1991, the band in which the exchange rate is allowed to float freely was widened from 2 to 4.
  
Table 2. Growth and Its Composition During Exchange-Rate-Based  
Inflation Stabilization Plans Fixed Effects Estimates (1964-1994) 
           
 Stabilization Plan Dummies 
 Early Late 
           
Percent Change in: 
Real GDP 2.355 -4.252 
 (0.869) (1.538) 
Private Consumption 5.072 -7.001 
 (1.342) (2.307) 
Public Consumption 0.890 0.210  
 (2.009) (3.453) 
Fixed Investment 5.926 -8.013 
 (3.268) (5.616) 
 
As a Percent of GDP: 
Private Consumption 3.419 2.872 
 (1.236) (2.125) 
Public Consumption -0.460 -0.190  
 (0.860) (1.479) 
Fixed Investment -0.768 -0.366 
 (0.664) (1.142) 
           
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The 12 plans included in the  
sample are those listed in Table1. The countries in the sample are  
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Israel, Mexico, and Uruguay. There are 180  
observations in the panel. The country-specific means are not reported but  
are available from the authors. Regressions which allowed for a break in the  
means in the pre- and post-debt crisis period (not reported) yielded the same  
qualitative results.  
 
